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RIVIERA TO THE RHINE
1990
The Forest of Parroy
Well before the XII Corps
entered Luneville on 16 September, the Fifth Panzer Army had
established bases and depots deep in the Forest of Parroy, using
its cover as an assembly area for troops and armor mounting
counterattacks against the Third Army's right flank.
Subsequently, the forest had served the same purpose during
German attempts to recapture Luneville, and German artillery
hidden in the forest had continued to harass XV Corps' positions
and lines of communication in the Luneville area. Von Luettwitz
knew he would have to make a stand in the forest, not only to
hold back American progress toward the Weststellung and the
Saverne Gap, but also to protect the southern flank of the LVIII
Panzer Corps as the latter continued its armored counterattacks
in the sector north of the Rhine-Marne Canal.
Roughly ovoid in shape, the Forest of Parroy extends about six
miles west to east and over four miles north to south, covering
an area of nearly thirty square miles {Map 18). Much of the
forest area is flat, but thickly wooded with mostly secondary
growth of hardwoods, a few stands of older, bigger timber, and
an occasional patch of conifers. Unlike most European forests,
the Parroy was also characterized by a thick undergrowth that
drastically limited observation and visibility. One third-class
east-west route, the Haut de la Fait Road, passed through the
center of the forest where it bisected the equally poor north-south
Bossupre Road. In addition, the forest was crisscrossed with
fire lanes, logging tracks, and beds of abandoned narrow-gauge
railroads of World War I vintage, most of which could
accommodate armored vehicles, but on a strictly one-way basis.
Other features included deteriorated trenches and minor
defensive installations dating back to World War I.
To these the defenders had added mines, barbed wire, road and
trail blocks, new trenches, and timber-roofed dugouts; while the
poor September weather produced cold and often torrential rains,
fog and mist, mud, and swampy spots - all of which made the
Forest of Parroy an unpleasant place in which to travel, let
alone fight a pitched battle.
In the fluid combat conditions that had existed earlier in
September 1944, the bulk of XV Corps might well have bypassed
the Forest of Parroy, leaving follow-up forces to surround,
isolate, and clear any Germans that remained. But with the
limits imposed on offensive operations. General Patton decided
to secure the area by force in order to acquire better positions
for subsequent XV Corps attacks. If undisturbed, German infantry,
artillery, and armor in the forest could control the main
highway (N-4) leading to Sarrebourg and the Saverne Gap,
severely hampering a rapid advance eastward.
General Wyche, with Haislip's approval, had originally planned a
frontal attack from the west combined with a single envelopment
on the east side of the forest. After meeting little German
opposition in the Mondon forest, the two commanders expected the
same here, hoping that the 106th Cavalry Group and one infantry
regiment of the 79th Division could sweep through the forest,
while an armored task force of the French 2d Armored Division struck northeast across the Vezouse River to
isolate the woods on the east. The operation was to begin on 25
September after heavy Allied air strikes.
From the start, little went according to plan. Poor flying
weather forced postponement of the air strikes, and Wyche was
unable to start his attack until the 25th. In the interim,
Leclerc had sent a small force over the Vezouse, but German
artillery fire broke up the French infantry formations and the
soggy ground confined the French armor to the roads, leading
Leclerc to pull his units south, back across the river, before
the 79th Division had even begun its assault into the forest.
Continued inclement weather caused Wyche to postpone air and
ground attacks on the 26th and 27th, and finally Haislip decided
to relieve Leclerc's division of its part of the operation and
leave the entire task to Wyche. Meanwhile, American patrols into
the forest had discovered that the Germans were preparing to
defend the woods in strength. Accordingly, Wyche revised his
plans, deciding to send two infantry regiments into the forest
from the west while the cavalry group screened the area to the
north along the Rhine-Marne Canal. Abandoning the whole concept
of isolating the forest on the east, both Haislip and Wyche
probably felt that a less complex approach - concentrating their
superior artillery and infantry resources in one sector - was
the best solution considering the terrain and weather.
The American attack into the Parroy forest finally began on 28
September, one day before the XV Corps was to pass to 6th Army
Group control. The air attack began at 1400 followed by the
ground assault of the 313th and 315th Infantry at 1630 that
afternoon. However, of the 288 bombers and fighter-bombers
scheduled to participate in the preparatory strikes, only 37
actually arrived, again because of poor flying conditions; and
the results of the 37-plane attack against a target covering
some thirty square miles were negligible. In addition, the two-hour
interval between the last air strikes and the beginning of the
79th Division's ground attack gave the Germans ample time to
recover from whatever shock effect the limited bombardment may
have had. As a result the 79th Division infantrymen found
themselves locked in a bitter struggle with the German defenders
as soon as they began to penetrate the forest.
Even as the 79th Division began its attack, General Balck was
again reassessing the situation in the area. North of the
Rhine-Marne Canal the LVIII Panzer Corps' counterattacks had
ground to a halt with more heavy losses in German armor and
infantry. With no reinforcements, Balck instructed the Fifth
Panzer Army to go on the defensive all across its front. To
protect the Saverne Gap, he regarded both the Forest of Parroy
and the Rambervillers sector as critical. Believing the latter
to be more vulnerable, however, he instructed von Manteuffel and
Wiese on the 29th to give defensive priority to the
Rambervillers area, where the French 2d Armored Division and the
VI Corps' 45th Infantry Division threatened the boundary between
the two armies. To assist von Manteuffel in this task, he moved
the boundary of the Fifth Panzer Army eleven miles south of
Rambervillers, making the XLVII Panzer Corps responsible for the
area. Von Manteuffel, in turn, moved his internal corps boundary
south, allowing the LVIII Panzer Corps, under Lt. Gen. Walter
Krueger, to direct the defense of the Parroy forest, while the
XLVII Panzer Corps concentrated its efforts in the
Rambervillers-Baccarat region.
Simultaneously Balck and von Manteuffel reorganized the Fifth
Panzer Army in order to simplify command and control problems,
consolidating battered units and strengthening existing
divisions. In the process, the 11th Panzer Division absorbed
what was left of the 111th Panzer Brigade; the 21st Panzer
Division took over the 112th Panzer Brigade (less a battalion of
the 112th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which went to the 16th
Infantry Division); and the hard-hit 113th Panzer Brigade was
incorporated into the 13th Panzer Grenadier Division. This left
Army Group G with only one panzer brigade in reserve, the 106th,
which had not yet arrived from the First Army's area, and Balck
and von Manteuffel made tentative plans to commit this brigade
in the Rambervillers area.
Balck ended the month of September by admonishing his three army
commanders not to surrender any ground "voluntarily." Every
penetration of the forward lines was to be restored by an
immediate counterattack.
Too often, Balck informed them, reserve forces had been
frittered away by premature commitments to weak points and to
sections of the front only presumably threatened. In the future,
all withdrawals would need his personal approval and would only
be authorized if they improved current defensive positions. The
Hitler order still stood - to hold west of the Weststellung in
order to allow completion and garrisoning of fortifications
there. The defense of the Parroy forest would represent the
first test of Balck's orders.
The Forest and the Fight
During these deliberations the U.S. 79th Division and the German
15th Panzer Grenadier Division had been battling throughout the
western section of the Parroy forest. The 79th had attacked from
the west with two regiments abreast - the 315th Infantry north
of the Fait Road and the 313th Infantry to the south. Both
regiments made painfully slow progress against determined German
resistance, and, by evening on the 30th, the attacking infantry
had penetrated scarcely over a mile into the dense forest.
During this period the fighting quickly fell into a pattern that
continued throughout the battle. Abandoning any attempt at a
linear defense, the Germans maintained a thin screening line
opposite the Allied advance and concentrated their troops at
various strongpoints. By day, German forward artillery observers,
hidden in prepared positions, called down predetermined
artillery or mortar barrages on advancing American troops; and
the concentrations were often followed by small infantry-armored
counterattacks moving at an oblique angle down one of the
firebreaks or dirt tracks. During the night, smaller German
infantry patrols attempted to infiltrate the flanks and rear of
the attacking American forces, disorganizing them and
interfering with resupply efforts. Often when one American unit
was forced back, the others stopped their forward progress to
avoid exposing their flanks to further German attacks. Poor
visibility in the forest compounded American command and control
problems, and the frequent German counterattacks put the
attackers on the defensive much of the time. Again and again
disorganized American units were forced to fall back, reorganize,
and launch counterattacks of their own to regain lost ground.
On 1 October both sides sent reinforcements into the battle. The
LVIII Panzer Corps deployed two battalions of the 113th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment, 113th Panzer Brigade, into the forest
accompanied by additional armor. On the American side, Wyche
sent his third infantry regiment, the 314th, into the fray. The
division commander wanted the 314th Infantry to move into the
forest from the south, just east of the main penetration, and
push against the flank of the defenders facing the 313th
Infantry, allowing that regiment to drop back in a reserve role.
Although well executed, the maneuver did not seem to shake loose
the German defenses. The 79th Division's progress remained
painfully slow and it was not until 3 October that the last
battalion of the 313th Infantry was relieved. On the same day
the Germans once again reinforced their troops in the forest,
this time with the 2d Battalion of the 104th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment, 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, and a few more tanks
and self-propelled guns. Wyche, meanwhile, with Haislip's
approval, shortened the front line of the 315th Infantry by
making the 106th Cavalry Group responsible for the northern part
of the American advance and allowing the 315th to concentrate
its forces just above the Fait Road. Between 4 and 6 October,
American infantry units renewed their attacks, pushing eastward
through the middle of the forest and overrunning several German
strongpoints near the juncture of the Fait and Bossupre roads.
The Germans then counterattacked with the understrength 11th
Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion (from the 11th Panzer Division),
forcing elements of the 315th Infantry back from the crossroads.
But elsewhere the Americans held their ground. Temporarily
exhausted, both sides spent 7 and 8 October patrolling,
reorganizing, and resupplying their forces and, in the American
camp, preparing to resume the offensive on the morning of the
9th.
The new attack began with a diversionary demonstration at
daybreak by the 1st Battalion, 313th Infantry, reinforced with
tanks, south of the forest. Evidently, the ruse met with some
success, for the Germans shelled the roads along the Vezouse
throughout the morning and provided little direct fire support
to their troops in the Parroy forest. There XV Corps and 79th
Division artillery laid down the heaviest preparatory barrage of
the entire operation, clearing the way for the main attack which
began at 0650, with ample artillery support on call. Initially
two battalions of the 315th Infantry drove eastward north of the
Fait Road, while the 3d Battalion, 315th Infantry, and the 2d
Battalion, 314th Infantry, concentrated against the German
strongpoint at the central crossroads, finally overrunning that
position about 1800. Meanwhile, two battalions of the 313th
Infantry moved into the line south of the 2d Battalion, 314th
Infantry, and pushed eastward south of the crossroads; still
farther south the rest of the 314th Infantry aggressively
patrolled through the southern third of the forest. At dusk the
79th Division's center had advanced only a mile and a half
beyond the central crossroads, but the infantry commanders
hopefully noted that German resistance was beginning to diminish.
During the evening of 9 October Krueger outlined the status of
his forces to von Manteuffel and reported that he was unable to
restore the situation with the forces available. The loss of the
interior roads and the central strongpoints made further
defensive efforts costly, especially if the Americans began to
threaten the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division's routes of
withdrawal. The only uncommitted forces were two battalions (with
an aggregate strength of about 550 troops) of the division's
115th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and two fortress battalions (1),
but using these units would deprive the defenders of their last
reserves and leave no maneuver units for operations east of the
forest. Accordingly, the LVIII Panzer Corps commander requested
permission to withdraw from the Parroy forest to a new defensive
line, and the Fifth Panzer Army and Army Group G had no choice
but to approve the request.
Except for some rear-guard detachments, the main body of German
troops in the forest withdrew during the night of 9-10 October
to a new defensive line several miles east of the woods, tying
in with the XLVII Panzer Corps' 21st Panzer Division at Domjevin,
with the intercorps boundary later moving a few miles south to
Ogeviller. German losses during the fight for the Forest of
Parroy, 28 September through 9 October, numbered approximately
125 men killed, 350 wounded, over 700 missing (most of them
taken prisoner), and about 50 evacuated for various sicknesses.
(2) More significant, however, they had now lost their principal
forward defensive position along the approaches to the Saverne
Gap.
More Reorganizations
During 11 and 12 October, the 79th Division and the 106th
Cavalry Group cleared the remainder of the forest and pushed on
to the new German defensive lines to the east. A final advance
by all the 79th's regiments on the 13th managed to secure
Embermenil, in the center of the German line, but elsewhere the
division made only limited progress in the face of heavy German
artillery and mortar fire and flooded ground. Thereafter the
dispositions of the division remained essentially unchanged.
The subsequent inactivity of the XV Corps was due in part to the
redeployment of many Third Army support units, which had to be
returned by the 15th. At the request of General Devers, Bradley
agreed to allow Haislip to retain two heavy field artillery
battalions, but the XV Corps lost four field artillery
battalions, four antiaircraft gun battalions, a three-battalion
engineer combat group, a tank destroyer battalion, and some
lesser units, forcing Haislip to pause while he redistributed
his remaining support forces.
On the German side Army Group B was once again to be
strengthened at the expense of Army Group G, not only to satisfy
Army Group B's immediate requirements, but also in preparation
for the Ardennes offensive scheduled for December. (3) The bulk
of the 13th Panzer Grenadier Division withdrew from its lines
opposite the 79th Division during the night of 15-16 October,
and on 17 October the sector passed to the control of the 553d
Volksgrenadier Division, (4) with an effeclive infantry strength
of no more than a few battalions. To bolster the division for
its defensive mission, Army Group G reinforced it with the
1416th Fortress Infantry Battalion, the 56th Fortress Machine
Gun Battalion, and the 42d Panzer Grenadier Replacement
Battalion.
Next, the Fifth Panzer Army headquarters passed to Army Group
B's control on 16 October, leaving Army Group G with only two
subordinate army commands, the First and the Nineteenth. The
First Army assumed command of the LVIII Panzer Corps in the
north, and the Nineteenth Army took control of the XLVII Panzer
Corps in the south. A new boundary, separating the First and
Nineteenth Armies, began at Ogeviller and ran northeast across
the Vosges to pass a few miles north of Strasbourg. The XLVII
Panzer Corps' attachment to the Nineteenth Army was short-lived,
and one day later, on 17 September, OB West also transferred
this headquarters to Army Group B's control, providing the
Nineteenth Army with the LXXXIX Corps headquarters as a
substitute.
Logistical problems, bad weather, and, apparently, slow
intelligence analysis helped prevent the 79th Division from
taking advantage of the German redeployments east of the Parroy
forest. Moreover, the XV Corps was waiting for the 44th Infantry
Division - the new third division that Eisenhower had promised
Devers in September - to reach the front before the 79th
Division resumed the offensive. The 44th Division, under the
command of Maj. Gen. Robert L. Spragins, closed its assembly
area near Luneville on 17 October and during the next few days
took over 79th Division positions from the vicinity of
Embermenil south to the Vezouse River, while the 79th
concentrated on a narrower front for a new attack.
On 21 and 22 October the three regiments of the 79th Division,
advancing abreast across a front of almost two and a half miles,
gained nearly a mile and a half in a north-easterly direction
from Embermenil, thus securing better defensive terrain as well
as better observation of German positions. On the 23d the 44th
Division started to relieve the 79th Division in place, which
then began a much needed rest. Tragically, for General Patch,
commanding the Seventh Army, the relief came two days too late.
His son, Capt. Alexander M. Patch III, commanding Company C of
the 315th Infantry, was killed by German mortar fire on 22
October, and the army commander was to feel the loss deeply for
many months to come.
For the remainder of October the 44th Infantry Division played a
rather static role, but one that prepared the new division for
forthcoming offensive actions. Its activities were limited
mostly to patrols and artillery duels, and little attempt was
made to gain new ground. Elements of the 106th Cavalry Group
maintained contact with Third Army units along the line of the
Rhine-Marne Canal and undertook limited reconnaissance, but
adopted a generally defensive attitude.
To the south, the French 2d Armored Division continued to rest
and refit. From 30 September to 3 October, units of the division
had supported the advance of the VI Corps' 45th Division to the
Rambervillers area, culminating in several sharp engagements
along the Rambervillers-Baccarat highway. On the 3d the French
armor was relieved of its responsibilities in the zone by the VI
Corps' 117th Cavalry Squadron, and, as planned, the division
went on the defensive for the remainder of the month.
During this period the French division kept three of its four
combat commands (5) in the line, rotating each to the rear for
sorely needed rest, rehabilitation, and vehicle maintenance.
From 3 through 30 October the division lost approximately 35 men
killed and 140 wounded, most of them as a result of German
artillery or mortar fire. (6) As dusk came on the 30th, the
division was preparing to launch an attack to seize Baccarat, an
operation that once again would alarm the German high command
and divert their attention from the more direct approaches to
the Saverne Gap.
(1) The 1416th Fortress Infantry Battalion and
the 51st Fortress Machine Gun Battalion.
(2) The German casualty figures in the text are based on various
figures given in Mosenthal, CMH MS R-74. A thorough search of
106th Cavalry Group, 79th Division, XV Corps, and Seventh Army
files failed to produce any usable casualty figures for the
106th Cavalry Group and the 79th Division during the period 28
September through 9 October.
(3) For the planning and buildup for the Ardennes, see Hugh M.
Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, United States Army in
World War II (Washington, 1965), chs. 1-3.
(4) The German Army began forming Volksgrenadier ("people's
grenadier") divisions in August and september 1944. The new
divisions had a rather austere authorized strength of around
12,000 troops. Division artillery consisted of three instead of
four battalions; there was no divisional antitank battalion; and
service elements were greatly reduced. On the other hand the
infantry elements, armed primarily with automatic weapons, had
markedly more firepower than the infantry of standard divisions;
furthermore, the infantry regiments and battalions of the
Volksgrenadier divisions had their own organic antitank weapons.
Most were built on the remnants of older divisions shattered
during the earlier fighting in France or on the eastern front;
for example, 553d Volksgrenadier Division was formed around
cadre and veterans of the 553d Infantry Division.
(5) Unlike other French and American armored divisions, the 2d
French Armored Division normally operated with four rather than
three combat commands. The fourth, CCR, was named after its
commander, Col. Jean S. Remy, who in the division's
administrative structure was also the commander of the
division's organic reconnaissance squadron, the 1st Moroccan
Spahis Regiment. CCR's basic organization consisted of the
headquarters and one troop of the 1st Moroccan Spahis, an
armored infantry company, a towed antitank company, a battery of
armored field artillery, and a platoon of combat engineers.
Other units were added as dictated by circumstances and
missions. CCR was, in effect, a permanent
reconnaissance-in-force organization, but could also be employed
as a ready reserve if the tactical situation called for it.
(6) Total XV Corps casualties for the month of October,
including those of the 2d French Armored Division, numbered
about 365 men killed, 2,310 wounded, 165 missing, and 2,410
nonbattle. During the month XV Corps received 5,720 replacements
or returnees, and the corps captured over 1,760 Germans.
[...]
XV Corps Attacks
After the French 2d Armored
Division's seizure of Baccarat and after some minor 44th
Division advances during the first week of November, little
change had taken place along the XV Corps' front until the night
of 11-12 November. Then, under cover of darkness, the 79th
Division began moving into forward assembly lines in the Mondon
forest south of the Vezouse River (Map 26). Heavy rains had
gradually turned into blizzards during the days preceding the
attack, and by evening of the 12th wet snow blanketed the entire
corps sector. All streams in the area were flooded, many roads
and bridges were under water, and the troops described the now
ever-present French mud as bottomless. (1) In fact, the weather
had been so poor that General Devers contemplated postponing
Haislip's attack; but about 2300 that night he decided to
proceed with the offensive, hoping that the Germans might not
expect a major attack under such adverse conditions. (2) The
44th and 79th Divisions, each with two regiments abreast, jumped
off on schedule early the following morning of 13 November.
Behind an intensive artillery preparation, the 44th Division
attacked along the axis of the railroad line to Sarrebourg, with
the 324th Infantry on the left and the 71st Infantry on the
right. At first both regiments advanced rapidly, but by 0800 the
Germans had recovered from the bombardment and responded with
heavy and accurate artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire all
across the division's front. By dark, disappointing gains had
carried the leading battalions hardly a mile eastward, and the
high point of the day was the capture of battered Leintrey, a
small town at the junction of three secondary roads. Operations
on 14 November were even less productive, and General Spragins,
the division commander, decided to commit his reserves, the
114th Infantry, in the Leintrey area. After passing through the
71st Infantry on the south, the 1 14th was to swing north across
the fronts of the other two regiments, sweeping through the
defenses of the 553d Volksgrenadier Division from the flank and
rear.
This somewhat unorthodox - if not dangerous - maneuver proved
successful; by the evening of the 15th, the 114th Infantry had
gained a mile and a half to the east, northeast, and north of
Leintrey, thus dislocating the German defenses in the rising,
partially wooded ground. On 16 November the 114th Infantry and
the 106th Cavalry Group mopped up on the division's left, and
the next day the 324th and 71st Infantry continued their advance
east, passing through the wake of the 114th, which reverted to
its reserve status.
By 18 November the defenses of the 553d Volksgrenadier Division
began to unravel in the face of the continuing attack. During
the following day
{riviera3.jpg}
the 71st Infantry undertook the division's main effort and
pushed some nine miles along the axis of Route N-4, coming
almost within sight of the Rhine-Marne Canal, about six miles
short of the division's objective, Sarrebourg. To the north, the
324th, now in support of the 71st, kept pace, as did elements of
the 106th Cavalry stretching eastward along the canal. The 44th
Division had achieved at least half of the breakthrough that
Haislip had hoped for.
South of the 44th Division, General Wyche's 79th Division began
its attack on 13 November from a line of departure near
Montigny, at the junction of Routes N-392 and N-435. By the
following day the 314th Infantry on the left had reached
Halloville, while the 315th on the right pushed several miles up
Route N-392 toward Badonviller. The Halloville thrust threatened
to drive a wedge between the 553d and 708th Volksgrenadier
Divisions and was clearly the most dangerous penetration. As the
708th prepared a strong counterattack, the 315th Infantry,
moving up to support its sister unit, struck first and sent an
infantry force backed by tanks and tank destroyers into the
German assembly area east of Halloville, which dispersed the
German reserves and, in the process, destroyed most of the
708th's assault guns. (3)
On the 15th the Germans made two more attempts to restore the
situation in the Halloville sector. First, elements of the 553d
Volksgrenadier Division Struck south from Blamont, along Route
N-4 and the Vezouse River about three miles north of Halloville.
Then another force, probably under the direct control of the
LXIV Corps, moved up from the southeast. So ineffectual were
these efforts that the 79th Division's forward units reported no
unusual activity. Thus, as the 44th Division began to dislocate
the 553d Division's defenses in the north, the 79th Division now
began to penetrate the lines of the 708th Division at will,
walking nearly unopposed into Harbouey, two miles northeast of
Halloville, and continuing its advance toward the southern
approaches to Sarrebourg.
At the headquarters of both the Nineteenth Army and the LXIV
Corps, the situation began to appear desperate as early as 16
November. Lacking any radio or telephone communications with the
708th Volksgrenadier Division, the German commanders believed
that the converging Allied attacks along Route N-4 had pushed
back the 708th's right flank, thus cutting off the 553d
Volksgrenadier Division from the rest of the corps. Actually the
situation was not yet that bleak. During the night of 15-16
November, the left of the 553d had fallen back in fairly good
order to Blamont and reestablished a defensive line on the
Vezouse to Cirey-sur-Vezouse. About the same time, the rather
disorganized right wing of the 708th Volksgrenadiers began
moving into line south from Cirey along rising, forested terrain
dotted with installations of the Vosges Foothill Position.
Nevertheless, the condition of LXIV Corps' defenses was rapidly
becoming a serious problem.
On 16 November Haislip began to commit elements of the 2d
Armored Division in order to secure the flanks of both attacking
divisions and to ensure that the momentum of the offensive
continued. Combat Command Remy (CCR) began to push southeast
from Halloville along secondary roads, clearing roadblocks and
mines and generally disorganizing the 708th Division's lines of
communication. On the 17th CCV reinforced Remy, striking east
about five miles along Route N-392 from Montigny to seize
Badonviller and then swinging north two miles to Bremenil.
Meanwhile, to the north, elements of CCL (de Langlade) began
moving up to Blamont along Route N-4, as 79th Division infantry
forces crossed the Vezouse River to the east, in the face of
still strong opposition from the 553d Volksgrenadier Division,
and began to invest the town from the north.
On 18 November, as the 44th Division started its deep
penetration of the 553d Volksgrenadiers' front along Route N-4,
the right of the 708th Volksgrenadier Division collapsed, as
Wiese had feared. CCR and elements of CCV subsequently rolled
northward for four unopposed miles to capture bridges at Cirey-sur-
Vezouse. The Badonviller-Cirey road had been a main supply route
of the German defenders, and the French found it clear of
roadblocks and mines. On the same day, the left of the 79th
Division walked unopposed into Blamont. Although German
artillery and mortar fire halted further progress north of the
Vezouse, the effect was only temporary.
During the night of 18-19 November, the left wing of the 553d
Volksgrenadier Division withdrew in a vain attempt to establish
a new defensive line from Richeval, five miles north-east of
Blamont, south and east through Tanconville to Bertrambois and
Lafrimbolle. The American and French attackers never gave the
553d time to pause. By noon on the 19th, the 79th Division's
314th regiment was approaching Richeval; the 315th had passed
through Tanconville; CCL had cleared Bertrambois; and CCR units
had reached out to Lafrimbolle in the mountains, a mile and a
half east of Bertrambois. Haislip was now ready to begin the
exploitation phase of his attack, and at 1345 that afternoon he
turned the rest of Leclerc's 2d Armored Division loose.
[...]
(1) XV Corps AAR, Nov 44, p. 13. In mid-November,
flooding along the fronts of the Third and Seventh Armies was
supposedly the worst in the area since 1919.
(2) G-3 Section, HQ, 6th Army Gp, Final Report, World War II, p.
21.
(3) The 315th claimed the destruction of five assault guns and "some
other vehicles" (315th Inf AAR, Nov 44, p. 16), while von
Luttichau's "German Operations," ch. 22, relates that the
Germans lost nine of the ten assault guns sent into action.
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