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COMBAT STUDIES
INSTITUTE, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
BATTLEBOOK 11-C - FORET DE PARROY
Mai 1984
On orders from the regimental
commander, the 313th REGIMENT spent most of the 12 October
patrolling east and northeast of LUNEVILLE to determine the
strength and location of the withdrawing German forces. By the
evening of the 12 October, it had been determined that the
Germans had established strong defensive positions in EMBERMENIL
and along the ridgeline to the east of EMBERMENIL. The division
commander ordered preparations to begin to seize EMBERMENIL and
the ridgeline with the attacks to commence on the 13th. (51)
From the German perspective, EMBERMENIL was critical to hold. A
critical rail line extending from EMBERMENIL east to STRASBOURG
and into Germany was the principal pipeline supporting German
forces in the region. Additionally, the ridgeline east of
EMBERMENIL presented the first defensible terrain east of the
FORET DE PARROY. However, the overall condition German forces
was poor due to weeks of constant fighting. Reinforcements had
been scarce, consisting in large part of medical rejects, old
men, and young boys originally destined to perform security
roles along the German frontier. The prime fighting replacements
were being sent to the north to participate in the upcoming
ARDENNES offensive.
Despite these shortcomings the 5th PANZER ARMY was able to
establish a formidable defensive network. German commanders had
learned early in the battle of the overwhelming superiority of
American artillery and airpower and adjusted their tactics
accordingly. As indications mounted that the 79th DIVISION was
preparing to launch a major offensive on 9 October, the main
body of the German force withdrew from strongpoints within the
forest, leaving security elements to oppose the Americans. The
elements that withdrew began at once to develop a defensive belt
east of the forest. By doing this the American artillery and air
attacks struck mostly empty terrain within the forest and the
stay behind security forces were able to slow the attack using
economy of force tactics.
In the early morning hours of 13 October, the 79th DIVISION
began final preparations for the attack against EMBERMENIL. The
plan was for the 314th REGIMENT to attack to seize the high
ground south of the town, with the 313th REGIMENT attacking to
seize the town. The 315th REGIMENT was to remain in division
reserve.
At approximately 1330 hours on the 13 October, the division
began its attack. The 314th moved forward with two battalions
abreast against initially light resistance. The 313th also
attacked with two battalions abreast but encountered moderate to
heavy resistance as they attempted to move through the town.
Both regiments continued to encounter stubborn resistance
throughout the afternoon, but by 1700 the 313th had secured the
town. By 1800 the 314th had captured the high ground, but
continued to battle small pockets of resistance in the vicinity
of the railroad station just outside the town.(52)
Plans were made to continue the attack during the evening of the
13th. However, the weather had begun to deteriorate during the
afternoon, and by nightfall heavy rains severely hampered any
further progress. By early evening the division halted the
attack and concentrated on consolidating the objective and
preparing to continue the attack the next day.
At 0900 on 14 October the 313th REGIMENT, supported by the 3d
BATTALION, 314th, attacked the high ground to the east of
EMBERMENIL. The regiment immediately encountered heavy enemy
resistance, drawing heavy fire from wired and dug in enemy
positions along the entire front, and only small gains were
made. The 2d BATTALION, 313th continued the attack in mid
afternoon but quickly suffered two tanks destroyed from mines
and anti-tank fire. Heavy mortar and artillery fire forced the
battalion to withdraw.(53)
Following this second attack the division commander directed the
division to go on the defensive for a few days to give the men
time to get some much needed rest and to conduct equipment
maintenance. The 313th and 314th REGIMENTS remained deployed on
line, and the 315th continued in division reserve with its Ist
BATTALION providing security for the division's left flank. All
three regiments maintained aggressive patrolling to their front,
and the division was supported by CORPS ARTILLERY for harassing
fire.
During the 15 and 16 October, German forces launched several
limited counterattacks. In each case the German attack was
broken up by artillery fire.
On 17 October two German prisoners revealed German plans to
conduct a major attack against EMBERMENIL, and the railroad
station in particular. At 0320 the Germans launched a strong
attack with infantry and tanks preceded by an artillery barrage.
The American artillery failed to stop the Germans and the
division positions were penetrated. The 314th REGIMENT launched
a counterattack which restored the lines. A second German attack
was launched at 0330 against the 313th REGIMENT, but artillery
and mortar fire forced the Germans to withdraw before reaching
the 313th positions.
By 17 October, elements of the newly formed 44th DIVISION had
moved into positions around LUNEVILLE and preparations were made
for the successive relief of the 79th DIVISION units. Operations
Instruction No. 26 was issued which directed the attachment of
the 44th to the 79th to free 79th units for upcoming attacks.(54)
Additionally, the 44th DIVISION ARTILLERY was attached to the
79th for the attack which was to commence on the 20th.(55)
During the same period the Germans were also involved in the
relief of units. ARMY GROUP G headquarters had directed the
withdrawal of the 15th PANZERGRENADIER DIVISION to the north,
and reassignment to the LVIII PANZER CORPS to protect the
SAARBOURG avenue of approach.(56) To replace the 15th
PANZERGRENADIER DIVIS!ON, ARMY GROUP G assigned the 553d
VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION, which had suffered heavy losses in
fighting on 4 October near METZ.(57) To build up their combat
power the 553d was assigned several fortress infantry units and
flak batteries.(58) These troops had been destined to hold
security positions along the German border, and were not
considered suitable for front line fighting. However quality
replacements were not available due to the priority on
preparations for the Ardennes offensive.
The relief was completed without incident during 15-18 October.
To completely fill the gap left by a mechanized division, the
553d INFANTRY had to extend their lines to the north and south,
eventually extending their frontage for 35 kilometers.(59) The
division was further hampered by a total lack of self propelled
assault guns and limited anti-tank defenses. (60)
During 18 and 19 October the 79th continued to maintain its
positions and prepared to conduct an attack on the 21st to
finally dislodge the Germans from the ridgeline. To further
support this attack the 144th and 71st INFANTRY REGIMENTS of the
44th DIVISION were attached to the 79th DIVISION with the
mission of occupying the 79th positions.(61) The Germans
maintained light pressure on the 79th by conducting harassing
attacks. These attacks were all broken up by artillery fire.(62)
Adverse weather continued to preclude the use of friendly air
support. By the evening of the 19th the last regiment of the
44th had closed with the 79th and preparations were near
completion for the attack on the 21st.
During the evening of 20 October the 315th REGIMENT moved on
line with the other two regiments in preparation for the attack.
The Germans made heavy use of artillery fire during the
afternoon and evening, but with little result. The weather
cleared sufficiently for the XIX TAC to provide air interdiction
sorties against AMENCOURT. Bomb Damage Assessment indicated
troops, vehicles, and supplies were hit.(63)
At 0636 hours on 21 October, the 79th launched its attack with
three regiments abreast.(64) The division initially encountered
moderate resistance consisting of small arms and heavy mortar
fire, but by 0900 the 313th and 314th had reached their
objectives.(65) The 315th was held up by determined resistance
along the ridgeline, but achieved its objective at 1400 hours
after committing its reserve battalion.(66) Adverse weather
again prevented friendly air support.
On 22 October the 79th consolidated its positions and prepared
for relief by the 44th DIVISION. German forces launched several
counterattacks during the early morning hours but failed to
achieve a penetration.(67)
During the 23d the division continued to improve its positions
along the ridge and to fend off small enemy counterattacks. The
Germans launched one large attack against the 315th REGIMENT.
The attack was made by 100 infantry supported by four Mark IV
tanks.(68) By 1500 this attack had been repulsed after stubborn
fighting and heavy friendly artillery support. Once again bad
weather precluded friendly air support. During the evening of
the 23d the relief in place of the 79th DIVISION by the 44th
DIVISION commenced.
The relief in place continued smoothly on the 24th until 0615
when the Germans commenced a strong artillery barrage, and tanks
and infantry were observed preparing to attack.(69) US artillery
fire stalled the German attack until 0815 when the Germans
launched a strong attack against the 315th REGIMENT.(70) By 0845
two companies of the 315th had been driven from their positions,
but a counterattack supported by tanks regained the ground.(71)
Following these attacks the relief continued and at 1200 hours
Major General R.L. SPRAGINS, CG 44th DIVISION, formally assumed
responsibility for the sector.
The 79th DIVISION had completed three weeks of hard fighting
against four German divisions in bad terrain and under
abominable weather conditions. It had inflicted an indisputable
defeat on the Germans. Many factors were responsible for the
victory. The commanders displayed aggressive and competent
leadership and the men displayed determination and tactical
skills. The Americans showed tactical flexibility and good use
of combined arms teams.
Commanders made excellent use of reserves to influence the
action, and were able to maintain excellent control of their
units despite the terrain. But in the end the decisive factor
was the overwhelming American artillery and the ability to mass
fires.
51. History of the 313th Regiment, p. 125.
52. 314th Regiment, p. 44.
53. History of the 313th Regiment, p. 126.
54. 79th Division, "AAR," p. 8.
55. Ibid.
56. 79th Division, "G2 Bulletins", 20 OCT 44.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. 79th Division, 'AAR,' M p. 9.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. 79th Division, "AAR," p. 10.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
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